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RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is a method 
of wireless data collection technology that uses RFID 
tags or transponders to electronically store and 
retrieve data.  RFID tags are quickly replacing 
barcodes as the “identification system of choice” [1]. 
Since RFID devices are electronic devices, they can be 
hacked into by an outsider, and their data can be 
accessed or modified without the user knowing.  New 
threats to RFID-enabled systems are always on the 
horizon. A systematic classification should be used to 
categorize these threats to help reduce confusion.  This 
paper will look at the problem of security threats 




1. Introduction  
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are 
a subset of Automatic Identification (Auto-ID) 
systems.  These systems originally found common 
usage in access control and security applications, when 
they were used primarily to track products through the 
supply chain or manufacturing process, and to identify 
products at the point of sale or service [2].  Since the 
early 1970’s, bar code technology has been primarily 
used for Auto-ID systems. RFID systems have been 
seen by many industry professionals as the replacement 
for barcodes as the Auto-ID system of choice [1].  
RFID tags are small electronic tags that function much 
like barcodes.  The advantage of using RFID over 
barcodes include the fact that information about 
products with RFID tags can be transmitted from 
several products simultaneously, from a distance, and 
sometimes through physical barriers [3]. RFID is a 
contactless technology, and tags can be read whenever 
they are within range of a transmitted radio signal, and 
do not need to be brought within line of sight a scanner 
as does barcode technology. This is one of the main 
advantages of the use of RFID technology, since it 
reduces or eliminates most problems associated with 
other similar technologies that require contact or line-
of-sight in order to be scanned or read.  Because of 
this, RFID tags also avoid several problems that plague 
barcode systems, such as labels that get worn, dirty, 
bent, torn, or otherwise deteriorated so much so that 
they can no longer be scanned, making RFID tags ideal 
for dirty or wet environments in which barcode labels 
would quickly deteriorate.  There are several other 
aspects of the technology that make it favorable to 
barcodes. While barcodes only contain a product ID, 
RFID tags can hold sensors that transmit back to 
readers information on specific attributes of the 
product it is affixed to, such as temperature. This 
advancement in data transmission also enables 
companies to automatically update their databases, 
which could provide greater benefit for different 
activities within their value chain.  Unlike barcodes, 
users can also change the data on certain RFID tags. 
RFID tags are also processed more quickly than 
barcodes, with the average RFID system receiving and 
processing data simultaneously from hundreds of tags 
per second.  The average time it takes for a good read 
on a Read-Only RFID tag is between 30-100 
milliseconds. This allows RFID systems to simply scan 
tagged products as they enter a facility through gate 
readers and proximity devices embedded in company 
facility floors, rather than to manually retrieve a 
distinct individual visual reading of each barcode label.  
A truck’s cargo would not need to be unloaded to be 
scanned by an RFID reader, since the RFID tags on the 
cargo could be read through the sides of the truck.  The 
idea behind RFID is that eventually, when RFID tags 
and readers are so inexpensive that every product in the 
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supply chain can be tagged, RFID will allow managers 
to keep tabs on every minute detail of the supply chain, 
such as verifying that the right product is loaded on the 
right truck [1,4]. Unlike barcode, RFID is also quite 
difficult to copy. 
Of the billions of barcodes scanned daily 
worldwide, most are only scanned once over the 
product lifetime [2].  Since RFID-tagged objects can be 
tracked from anywhere on the globe in an instant as 
long as it is within range of an RFID transceiver, 
everyone in an RFID-enabled supply chain, “from the 
manufacturers at the factory to the inventory trackers at 
the retail location” can instantly obtain information on 
the location or condition of any particular object [1].  
With the increasingly widespread adoption of RFID 
systems such as passports and drivers licenses, a 
systematic classification of the security risks would be 
useful for potential adopters. The motivation for 
creating a taxonomy for RFID security threats is to 
condense and classify large amounts of data into a 
more easy-to-navigate format, and to direct potential 
users to further resources [5]. 
This paper will present an overview of RFID 
technology, an overview of security threats to RFID-
enabled systems, a taxonomy for categorizing these 
threats and possible solutions to these threats, and 
finally cover some of the factors in evaluating risk 






The growth in the industry in the middle of the 
decade was driven by the adoption of RFID technology 
by large organizations such as Wal-Mart and the 
Department of Defense [6,7]. The RFID industry grew 
to $5.56 billion in 2009, having tripled over the last 5 
years, and analysts estimate that the fast growing RFID 
market in China will fuel continued growth for the 
industry [8].    
The different kinds of tags can be used for a wide 
variety of purposes. Low frequency tags can be used 
for identifying lost pets, passport inspection, in 
supermarket checkout lines, or in automobile anti-theft 
systems.  High frequency tags can be used for tracking 
airline baggage or books in libraries. 
One of the most common uses of RFID systems are 
on toll booths, often called e-Tolling or Intelligent 
Traffic Systems. Toll road authorities have given out 
transponders that drivers connect to their credit cards.  
A reader in the toll booth automatically collects tolls 
from vehicles that pass through at up to 40 miles per 
hour, dramatically speeding the flow of traffic. Other 
uses include RFID-equipped Security Badges that not 
only control employee access to certain parts of a 
facility, but allow management to track the locations of 
employees within the facility. Several countries, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, most of the European Union, Australia, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines 
currently insert RFID tags into passports, Livestock 
tracking can also use RFID tags to track their growth 
and food intake to improve the  raising  of animals 
such as cows, pigs, and chickens. 
Another use for RFID is tracking livestock on large 
farms through RFID tags embedded under the skin 
Other uses include RFID-equipped bracelets given to 
children at amusement parks, so that lost children can 
quickly be found by RFID readers placed around the 
park.  One of the most common uses for RFID is for 
tracking goods through container loading facilities. 
Also, readers placed in heavily trafficked areas like 
airports would be able to easily monitor currency flows 
and illegal activities such as money laundering [9]. 
 
2.2 RFID System Components 
 
The typical RFID system is made up of three 
components:  The transceiver on the RFID reader, the 
transponder on the RFID tag, and the back-end 
database.  
RFID readers can communicate with RFID tags 
using either near-field or far-field methods. In near-
field RFID systems, the reader would contain an 
antenna (in the form of a coil), which produces a low-
level radio frequency magnetic field. This magnetic 
field serves “as a ‘carrier’ of power from the reader to 
the RFID card or tag.”  When a signal is sent from a 
tag to the reader, the reader will detect and process this 
signal, and verify whether the signal is valid.  If it is, 
the data is restructured and sent to the end-user’s host 
system.  Far-field systems would communicate with 
electromagnetic waves, rather than magnetic fields. 
Typical RFID tags are made up of three 
components:  The antenna, a silicon chip, and the 
enclosure. Tags in far-field RFID systems would 
contain a dipole-like antenna. Meanwhile, similar to 
the antenna on a reader, the antenna on a near-field 
RFID tag is made up of a coil.  The antenna receives 
signals from tag readers and transmits data from the 
chip, which stores data associated with the tag.  The 
antenna’s chip needs a small amount of electric power 
to function.  The antenna gathers energy present in the 
magnetic field produced by the reader and converts it 
into a source of electric power for the chip. This allows 
the tag’s antenna to transmit the contents of the chip to 
the reader via an electromagnetic signal.  The 
enclosure is the packaging around all the components 
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in the tag.  RFID tags can be affixed to any object that 
needs to be tracked, such as pets, vehicles, items in a 
store, shipping containers, or even people. These tags 
have antennas that allow them to communicate and 
respond to queries on the status of the object with 
RFID transceivers via radio signals.  
As of 2010, Hitachi has made the smallest RFID 
chip ever manufactured, at 0.075mm by 0.075mm [10].  
 
2.3 Tag Varieties in RFID Systems 
 
RFID tags come in two forms: passive tags and 
active tags. 
Passive tags contain no power source and must use 
the electromagnetic waves from the reader to send 
back signals.  These are the most commonly used tags.  
Passive tags have a much shorter range than active 
tags. Passive tags are often used as ID badges for 
employees, who only need to walk by a reader for the 
tag’s data to be read.  As passive tags do not depend on 
a battery, they are much cheaper to produce than active 
tags. Passive tags are created with unique identification 
numbers, and the contents of their chips can never be 
changed. Their unique identification number is 
generally all that is transmitted to readers when 
queried. Passive RFID tags boast a moderate range 
from 10 mm to 6 meters.  Having no power supply 
means that passive tags have an incredibly long shelf 
life.  Another advantage is that the lack of a power 
supply means that the tag can be very small.  The 
smallest commercially available RFID tags are passive 
tags. 
Active tags contain a battery.  The battery energy, 
along with a larger antenna allows the tag to transmit 
stronger signals up to 1500 feet.  Active tags are also 
beneficial in areas with high tag travel speeds.  One of 
the main drawbacks to this however, is the dramatic 
increase in tag size. The smallest active RFID tag has 
dimensions of 26mm x 23mm x 7.3mm [11].  While 
the presence of a battery makes active tags more 
expensive to produce than passive tags, active tags are 
more accurate and reliable than passive tags.  Active 
tags have the same shelf life of their battery power 
source, which is usually between 3 to 10 years.  Active 
tags do not require special readers and can “readily 
satisfy applications that require a mix of both passive 
and active tags.”  Due to the battery power, active tags 
can hold much more data than passive tags, and this 
data can be written, re-written, or deleted using an 
external read/write device.  Likewise, active tags are 
much more expensive than passive tags, and have more 
security issues dealing with hackers that attempt to 
modify and overwrite the information of the chip. 
Active RFID tags can be further broken down into 
three categories:  Read-Only (RO), Read-Write (RW), 
and Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM).  The data on 
Read-Only tags are programmed when the tag is 
manufactured and cannot be changed or altered in any 
way.  The content of a Read-Write tag can be written-
to and read-from by users via readers that double as 
“writers,” and is usually used in applications such as 
prepaid value cards, , and industrial compliance 
marking, and toll collection. Write-Once-Read-Many 
tags are essentially Read-Only, in that once the data is 
written onto the tag, it cannot be altered.  The 
difference from Read-Only tags is that the data is not 
written onto the tag at manufacture, and the data can be 
written by the user once after manufacture.  
A further categorization of RFID systems can be 
found in [5]. 
 
3. Security Issues in Practice 
 
RFID tags have numerous benefits for security.  
Airline passenger and baggage tracking can be 
simplified by the use of RFID systems. Authentication 
systems can utilize RFID in applications such as key-
less entry systems for cars. RFID tags embedded in 
documents, products, or currency, can also combat 
forgery or money laundering [2]. However, there are 
several security issues raised by the use of such 
technology.  RFID tags are the “quintessential 
Pervasive Computing technology” [3].  A common 
issue with any sort of wireless system is security, and 
just as with wireless LANs, anyone with the correct 
kind of reader within range can read tag data. A hacker 
might even be able to overwrite data on active tags 
[12]. The choice between passive and active tags also 
present a number of issues.  Active tags have greater 
security concerns, but are several times more 
sophisticated.  
RFID systems have a number of traits that lend 
themselves to exploitation by malicious users.  While 
RFID tags have extremely limited complexity, the 
middleware, such as reader interfaces and back-end 
databases, have plenty of source code that hackers can 
exploit.  The reliance of generic Internet protocols and 
facilities for RFID middleware means that the system 
inherits their security vulnerabilities.  The financial or 
personal nature of data handled in RFID systems and 
back-end databases, along with the false sense of 
security RFID systems give users, also presents 
malicious users with an extremely tempting target [3].  
To highlight the ease at which some RFID systems 
can be exploited, in 2009, Chris Paget, a white hat 
using $250 worth of off-the-shelf components – some 
purchased off of eBay – built a mobile platform 
capable of cloning RFID tags used in drivers licenses 
and passcards (passport-like identification cards used 
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for travel between the US, Mexico, and Canada) [13]. 
These tags use no encryption and can be read from 
distances of over a mile, making them susceptible to 
tracking and spoofing. Using an RFID reader, an 
antenna mounted to the side of his car, and a laptop 
connected to the RFID reader via Ethernet cable. The 
laptop runs an application Paget developed which 
continuously prompts the reader to look for tags, 
logging the serial number each time one is detected. 
The equipment can pick up tags from 30 feet away, 
meaning Paget can glean info from license and 
passcard owners as he drives by them. With more 
expensive equipment, he can widen the range to read 
tags from over a mile away. 
The RFID tags only contain a record pointer to a 
secure database, rather than personally identifiable 
information.  However, this information can serve as a 
sort of electronic license plate, in order to track the 
movements of the passport or license’s owner, making 
this an example of a Traffic Analysis attack. This 
electronic license plate can be complemented with 
information gleaned from other sources in the user’s 
tag constellation, “such as electronic toll-booth 
payment systems or RFID-based credit cards” [13]. 
 
3.1 Security Requirements for RFID: The CIA-
DAD Triad Model 
 
High-security RFID systems must be able to defend 
against the unauthorized reading of tags in order to 
duplicate or modify data, the placing of spoofed or 
counterfeit tags within the interrogation zone of an 
RFID reader, and the eavesdropping of RFID 
communications for the purpose of traffic analysis or 




Figure 1. CIA-DAD Triad Model  
 
As shown in Figure 1, every system should have 
three main security requirements, highlighted in the 
CIA-DAD model of security threats [15].   
CIA stands for the three main security goals: 
• Confidentiality: The data can only be read by 
authorized parties 
• Integrity: Only authorized parties can modify 
data 
• Availability: Requires data to be available to 
authorized parties 
DAD, respectively, stands for the three main goals of 
hackers trying to attack the system: 
• Disclosure: Access to confidential 
information by unauthorized parties 
• Alteration: The modification of data by 
unauthorized parties 
• Denial: Denying services to authorized users. 
  
Confidentiality is a difficult goal to achieve in 
RFID systems, as tags indiscriminately reveal sensitive 
information when queried by readers.  Some of the 
common threats to RFID systems include the physical 
manipulation of RFID tags, denial of service attacks by 
signal jamming radio frequency channels, modifying 
the identity of an item through tag manipulation, and 
spoofing legitimate tags by writing properly formatted 
tag data onto blank or rewritable transponders [3,16].  
This technique was used by researchers from John 
Hopkins University and RSA Security when they 
spoofed a legitimate RFID tag and used it to unlock an 
RFID-based car immobilization system [3,17].  
Eavesdropping, sometimes called sniffing, is another 
common security threat.  Mark Weiser, an early 
visionary of ubiquitous computing, noted that privacy 
was a major problem that ubiquitous computing would 
have to solve [18].  RFID tags can be read from a 
distance by any compliant reading device without 
anyone’s knowledge.  A similar threat is malicious 
users using traffic analysis to gain critical information 
from the patterns of communication.  This is a 
dangerous threat, because critical information can be 
obtained from the traffic and not the actual content of 
the messages.  Thus, this technique can be performed 
even when encryption is utilized [3,16]. This is a major 
concern to those who believe the widespread use of 
RFID tags could compromise their privacy.  They fear 
that with widespread adoption of tags in the products 
they buy, eavesdroppers would be able to scan the 
contents of their home or even their pockets.  Even if 
tags only contain product codes, individuals could still 
be identified and tracked by the unique set of products 
(the “constellation”) they carry [19].  This perceived 
assault on privacy has led to the creation of 
organizations opposed to the use of RFID technology, 
such as CASPIAN [20] or FoeBuD [21].  Finally, 
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RFID relay devices can be used to set up replay attacks 
by intercepting and retransmitting RFID queries [22]. 
Security requirements in RFID systems are often 
hampered by low-cost issues. Consider an RFID 
system where one would like to implement access 
control and authentication.  Symmetric or public key 
cryptography can offer a solution. However, RFID tags 
have extremely limited resources. Oftentimes, they 
only have  between 2000 to 3,000 logic gate in which 
to available for on-tag security features [23]. This 
limitation immediately disqualifies use of several 
standard encryption algorithms. A standard 
implementation of Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) symmetric key encryption requires around 
20,000 to 30,000 logic gates [16]. Furthermore, many 
RFID system performance requirements often dictate 
that a certain number of tags must be read (oftentimes 
around 100 to 200) every second, further limiting the 
number of clock cycles that can be devoted to 
encryption algorithms [19].  Strong cryptography is 
beyond the resources of low cost tags (which cost 
around or less than $0.10 per tag) [2,24], although 
there are solutions for more sophisticated and 
expensive tags, such as NTRU [25] or TEA [26].  
Symmetric key encryption algorithms also introduce an 
overhead for complex key management.  Such tags 
must also be protected from physical attacks on the 
tags themselves that can be used by attackers to reveal 
their entire contents [19].  An attacker who can gain a 
shared key compromises the security of the entire 
system, thus tags cannot be trusted to store long-term 
secrets without protection from physical attacks. 
 
4. A Taxonomy for RFID Security Threats: 
 
Considering the large volume of knowledge on 
RFID security, this taxonomy serves the purpose of 
condensing some of that knowledge to make it easier to 
navigate, and direct potential adopters to further 
resources, and to give academics interested in the topic 
an overview of which subtopics can be expanded upon 
with further research [5]. The taxonomy is presented in 
the form of a tree node structure.  The branches are not 
mutually exclusive. The following is a taxonomy for 















The targets of an attack can be categorized using 
the CIA-DAD triad model [15], however, a fourth 
category, Authenticity, has been added.  An attack can 
aim to compromise a system’s confidentiality through 
disclosure. An attack can compromise a systems 
integrity by altering data that the attacker is not 
authorized to modify. An attack can compromise a 
system’s availability with a denial of service attack.  
Finally, an attacker can bypass a system’s access 
control to gain unauthorized access to the system 
without establishing authenticity, or without the 




  Eavesdropping 





An attack can either be passive or active [27]. 
 
4.2.1. Passive Methods. Passive attacks include 
eavesdropping (sometimes referred to as “sniffing”) 
and traffic analysis (sometimes referred to as 
“tracking”).  Passive attacks are attacks in which no 
data is modified.  Instead, these attacks involve 
monitoring messages for malicious intent.  Thus, these 
attacks do not fall into the categories of 
Integrity/Alteration or Availability/Denial in the CIA-
DAD model. 
 
Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping involves gaining 
unauthorized access to data.  An example of an 
eavesdropping attack highlighted by cryptography guru 
Bruce Schneier, involves the case of passports 
embedded with RFID tags [28].  Such tags are readable 
by any reader, not just those carried by passport 
control, and have been read at distances of up to 30 
feet.  An eavesdropper could be able to read passport 
information (name, age, nationality, etc.) from anyone 
nearby, completely undetected.  While the proponents 
of such passport systems claim that tags would only be 
readable from a few centimeters, Schneier asserts that 
wireless protocols can “work at much longer ranges 
than specified” [28]. RFID tags have multiple read 
ranges that vary depending on the setting and 
operational scenario [29]. 
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Traffic Analysis. A traffic analysis attack is like an 
eavesdropping attack, only instead of monitoring the 
content of the messages, the attributes of the message 
traffic are observed.  Who’s sending messages to 
whom?  How often?  What is the “constellation” of tag 
ID’s does an individual have at the moment?  Patterns 
in communication are observed.  Because the content 
of the messages are not the target of such attacks, this 




















4.2.2. Active Methods. Active attacks are attacks that 
involve more sinister attacks than just monitoring 
messages. 
 
Physical Attacks. The first category involves actual 
physical manipulation of the RFID tags in a system.  
RFID tags usually offer little to no resistance to these 
kinds of attacks [16].  These attacks are especially 
dangerous, because they are oftentimes unexpected. An 
RFID system can have extremely sophisticated 
electronic security, but it is useless if an attacker can 
easily walk into the building and steal a tag or reader 
without being noticed. 
 
Masquerade. Masquerade attacks include 
counterfeiting and spoofing. Counterfeiting involves 
modifying the identity of an item, while spoofing 
involves impersonating legitimate tags [16].  Examples 
of such include rewriting tags on expensive products in 
a store or warehouse with counterfeit data from much 
cheaper products, or spoofing a legitimate tag on a 
product so that the store or warehouse’s security 
systems mistakenly believe the product is still on its 
shelf [19].  
 
Replay. Replay attacks occur when a hacker intercepts 
and rebroadcasts an RFID query with an RFID relay 
device [22].  Revisiting Bruce Schneier’s example of a 
passport system where each passport is equipped with 
an RFID tag, a replay attack could be used to gain 
unauthorized access at a border crossing [30].  In his 
example, a group of people are in line at a border 
crossing.  An attacker could gain access by relaying 
messages to and from another traveler with a legitimate 
passport.  A customs agent’s reader sends a query to 
the attacker’s RFID tag.  The attacker receives the 
query and rebroadcasts it to the other traveler’s tag.  
The traveler’s tag responds as if the customs agent’s 
reader had broadcasted the query, sending a reply back 
to the attacker.  The attacker relays this reply back to 
the customs agent’s reader.  In doing this, the attacker 
has successfully impersonated the other traveler.  
Encrypting the messages would not prevent such an 
attack, since the attacker “is simply acting as an 
amplifier” [30]  
 
Denial of Service. Denial of Service attacks aim to 
reduce the availability of the system to zero.  In RFID-
enabled systems, this is usually done by using signal 
jamming to prevent RFID tags from being read [3].  
 
Malware. Malware, or malicious RFID code, is 
another category of active attacks.  Rieback et al 2006 
categorizes malware into three different categories: 
RFID-based exploits, RFID-based worms, and RFID-
based viruses [3,31]. RFID-based exploits include 
buffer overflows, code insertion, and SQL injection.  
Many devastating exploits can be written onto an RFID 
tag even with its memory constraints.  Buffer 
overflows are where the attacking RFID tag tries to 
access and modify out-of-bounds array values.  For 
example, for an array, Array[10], code should not be 
able to modify Array[k] for k >= 10.  Code insertion is 
the use of scripting language to insert malicious code 
onto user applications.  SQL injection is a variant of 
code insertion that performs unintended SQL queries 
on the victims’ databases.  Short commands such as 
“;shutdown--" or “drop table…” can be especially 
devastating [3,33].  RFID worms and viruses are self-
replicating RFID exploits that copy the malicious code 
across the network and infect other RFID tags by 
writing the exploit code over their data.  Worms do not 
require any user activity to propagate, however they 
are reliant on the presence of a network connection 
[34].  In Rieback et al 2006, researchers demonstrate 
Method 
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the feasibility of a self replicating RFID virus using 
only 127 characters on a tag with 896 bits of data [3]. 
To reiterate, the branches of this taxonomy are not 
mutually exclusive.  Some attacks combine attributes 
of several branches of the tree structure.  Even active 
attacks sometimes begin with passive attacks.  For 
example, replay attacks begin with eavesdropping to 




Figure 2. Proposed Taxonomy Architecture  
(Security Threats) 
 
5.  Solutions for Defending Against RFID 
Security Threats 
 
To combat these threats, clear security goals need 
to be established before implementation.  Products 
with RFID tags should not betray the privacy of those 
who purchase them. Information should not be 
disclosed to unauthorized readers, and it should not be 
possible to set up long-term tracking associations 
between RFID equipped products and users who 
purchase or use them. To prevent long-term 
associations, public tag output should be randomized 
or easily modified, while private tag contents should 
employ access control and/or encryption.  Users should 
be able to detect and disable any tags in the products 
they use.  Tags and readers should be protected from 
the spoofing of either party, replay attacks, and 
eavesdropping [2].  
The following is a taxonomy for defending against 
security threats to RFID systems. Again, the branches 
are not mutually exclusive. The same system can – and 






As with attacks on RFID systems, defense involves a 
target to defend against and a method to employ to 








The targets to defend against are also categorized using 
the CIA-DAD triad model. 
 
Method 
 Physical Access Control 
 Electronic Access Control 
 Anti-Malware 
 
There are several potential solutions to RFID threats.  
They can be fit into three categories:  Physical Access 
Control (e.g. disabling or killing tags), Electronic 
Access Control (e.g. read access control for tags), and 
general techniques used for fighting RFID malware. 
 
Physical Access Control 
 Disabling Tags 
 Faraday Cages 
 Jamming 
 Blocker Tags 
 
5.1. Physical Access Control 
 
The first solution category is physical access 
control, usually through shielding, disabling, or killing 
tags [35].  As tagged products go from one link on the 
supply chain to the next, or as they reach the hands of 
consumers, users can disable the tags, partially or 
completely.  Killing tags is the most straightforward 
defense against RFID security threats: A product’s 
RFID tag is killed before it enters the hands of 
consumers. For example, at a retail store, checkout 
clerks would kill the RFID tags in purchased goods so 
that no purchased goods contain active tags [36].   
However, this also gets rid of many of the benefits of 
using RFID tags in the first place, especially as new 
RFID applications are starting to emerge for 
consumers, like airline tickets embedded with RFID 
tags for simpler tracking of passengers [36]. One 
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solution to prevent tags from being eavesdropped is the 
use of Faraday Cages.  Faraday Cages are containers 
made of metal mesh or foil that can block radio signals.  
These containers can be used to keep unused tagged 
products to prevent passive attacks on these products 
[16].  However, these may be cumbersome and thus 
impractical for certain RFID-equipped object. Another 
approach to ensure privacy is the active jamming of 
radio frequency signals, to disrupt nearby RFID 
readers that might try to eavesdrop the user’s tagged 
possessions.  However, this approach can disrupt other 
legitimate RFID systems nearby [37].  The use of 
smart “blocker tags” is another privacy solution.  
Blocker tags can simultaneously simulate all possible 
RFID tags to block RFID readers.  By simulating a 
selected subset of ID codes, the blocker tag can 
selectively block RFID readers used by outsiders [37].  
 
Electronic Access Control 
 Encryption 
 Random Access Control 
 
5.2. Electronic Access Control 
 
Another solution to RFID threats is electronic 
access control, through the use of classic cryptography 
algorithms, such as symmetric or public-key 
encryption.  However, as stated earlier, low-cost RFID 
tags are not sophisticated enough to handle some 
encryption algorithms. A potential solution is the use 
of read access control methods, like Hash-Based 
Access Control [19].  In hash-based access, tags are 
capable of carrying out a one-way hash function. A 
one-way hash is a function that is easy to compute, but 
for which it is difficult or impossible to compute its 
inverse. A simple example would be f(x) = x^2. 
Finding the square of a number is a simple procedure, 
but doing the inverse, finding a number’s square root, 
is much more difficult without the aid of a calculator. 
Each tag is associated with a key, and each tag stores 
the hash of its key.  In Hash-Based Access Control, 
each tag has two states: locked and unlocked. While in 
a locked state, the tag will respond to any and all 
queries by returning the hash of its key. To unlock a 
tag, the reader queries the tag in order to receive the 
hash of its key.  The reader then looks through the 
back-end database for the tag’s corresponding key. The 
reader transmits the key to the tag.  The tag hashes the 
key and compares it to the hash stored in its memory. 
If it is a match, the tag then unlocks. There are two 
downsides to this approach.  First, it is susceptible to 
replay attacks. An attacker could query a tag for the 
hash of its key, and then replay it for the reader in 
order to obtain its key. Also, since locked tags always 
output the same value (the hash of its key), this can be 
used as an identifier that malicious users can use to 
track tags in traffic analysis attacks. 
A way of overcoming this is with Randomized 
Access Control [19].  In this solution, tags are also 
equipped with a random number generator.  Instead of 
always responding with the same reply, which could be 
used by attackers in replay attacks, the tag concatenates 
its ID with a random number before hashing.  The tag 
then sends two values to the reader: the random 
number, and the hashed value.  The reader uses these 
two values to search the back-end database for the 
value that unlocks the tag. The downside of this 
method is that it is only practical for systems with a 
small number of tags, as the overhead increases 
significantly with the number of tags in the system. 
Poschmann et al. 2009 describes a cryptography 
algorithm using randomized access control for RFID 
systems that can be implemented within the oft-cited 
2000-3000 gate equivalent limit [23], and more 
recently, Alomair et al. 2010 propose a protocol for 
establish unconditional secrecy and unconditional 
integrity through randomized access control for use in 
low-cost RFID (i.e. potential tag price at or less than 
$0.10) systems [23]. 
In addition, Eisenbarth et al. 2007 chronicle several 
further lightweight Cryptography Implementations 




 Input sanitization 
 No back-end scripting 
 Limiting database access 




Four years have passed since the first paper 
detailing the plausibility of an RFID virus. However, 
as of 2010, the threat of an actual case of an RFID 
virus has yet to materialize, and thus, steps to defend 
against an RFID virus is not yet concrete. Most defense 
against RFID malware then focus on RFID-based 
exploits. To defend against RFID-based exploits, there 
are several steps that can be taken [3].  Bounds-
checking can be done to prevent buffer overflows.  
This is the process of ensuring that array values being 
accessed are within bounds.  To fight code insertion or 
SQL injection, the input can be sanitized by several 
means to get rid of characters that these attacks usually 
use, such as “<,” “>,” “&,” or “%.”  For example, it 
can be required that all input consist only of 
alphanumeric characters. However, this sometimes 
presents a problem, as there are times when the input 
needs these characters. Other methods include 
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eliminating back-end scripting support, limiting 
database access (i.e., making most or all database 
tables read-only), and parameter binding [3]. 
The solutions for RFID security threat described 
above are summarized in Figure 3 below.  Table 1, 
further below, also details the pros and cons associated 
with each viable security solution, for potential 
adopters of RFID systems to weigh security options 
against each other.   
 
6. Risk Analysis and Measurement: 
Balancing Cost and Risk in RFID Security 
 
Balancing cost and risk is a crucial aspect of 
securing RFID systems. If RFID technology is to 
replace barcodes as the Auto-ID system of choice, then 
RFID tags will substantially contribute to the cost of 
items that would otherwise be affixed with barcode 
tags. Even if the price of tags equipped with secure 
cryptography can be driven to $0.10, it would be 
impractical to attach them to low-cost items – “When 
retailers are to choose between tags that can perform 
sophisticated cryptographic operations and cheaper 
tags that cannot, it seems inevitable that the cheaper 
tags will prevail” [24]. 
An example of the costs that a system can incur from 
not adequately protecting itself from security threats 
can be seen in the case of the Mifare Classic smartcard 
[39]. There are an estimated 2 billion Mifare Classic 
cards used worldwide as payment cards for 
transportation networks or for access to schools, 
hospitals, and government buildings. In 2008, a group 
of researchers from Radboud University Nijmegen in 
the Netherlands managed to hack the Mifare Classic 
smartcard.  After learning of the breach, the Dutch 
Government postponed a one billion euro transport 
system similar to Mifare, moved to spend millions of 
euros upgrading its systems – including replacing the 
cards of all 120,000 civil servants at 5 euros per card, 
and posted armed guards outside all its buildings [40]. 
Mifare is an example of a large public application 
connected to a service product. Such a large-scale and 
open application requires rigorous security. However, 
NXP Semiconductors, the developer of the Mifare 
system, allegedly protected their system with poor or 
sloppy cryptography, and suffered both financially and 
in terms of reputation when the research team from 
Radboud University publicized their work [41]. In 
order to assess what methods should be used to protect 
RFID systems, one must compare the costs of 
implementing such systems versus the risk of not 
having such protections in place.  This risk factor, 
sometimes called the “Risk Exposure,” can be 
measured with the following equation: 
 
RE = P(UO) * L(UO), 
 
where RE is the Risk Exposure, P(UO) is the 
probability of an Unsatisfactory Outcome, and L(UO) 
is the loss to the stakeholders if such an outcome 
occurs [42].   
If the costs of implementing security protocols is 
far greater than the risk exposure, than it would 
probably 
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Figure 3. Proposed Taxonomy Architecture (Security Solutions) 
  
Table 1. Solutions for RFID Security Threats 
 
Solution Pros Cons 
Physical Access Control 
1. Disabling Tags 
2. Faraday Cages 
3. Jamming 
4. Blocker Tags 
Establishes Confidentiality, 
Availability 
1. Can handle many if not 
most privacy concerns 
2. Severely or completely 
eliminates opportunities for 
Passive and DoS attacks 
3. Eliminates opportunities for 
Passive DoS attacks 
4. Can selectively block RFID 
readers used by outsiders 
1. Limits usability of the 
system, especially as 
more RFID applications 
emerge 
2. At best a partial solution. 
Maybe cumbersome for 
certain RFID-equipped 
objects  
3.  Can disrupt legitimate 
RFID systems nearby. 
Could be illegal. 
Electronic Access Control 
1. Encryption 
2. Random Access Control 
Establishes Confidentiality, 
Authenticity 
1. More viable with cheaper 
tags 
2. Provides more security than 
simple  
1. Susceptible to Replay and 
Traffic Analysis attacks. 
2. Solves this, but the 
overhead limits this 
solution to small systems 
Anti-Malware 
1. Bounds-checking 
2. Input sanitization 
3. No back-end scripting 
4. Limiting database access 
5. Parameter binding 
Establishes Integrity 
1. Safeguards against Buffer 
Overflows 
2-5.Safeguards against Code 
Insertion and SQL Injection 
1. Sometimes produces run-
time delays 
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be better to take a risk and forego such protocols.  This 
can be highlighted with two example RFID 
applications: A closed industrial application and a 
public application connected to monetary and material 
goods.  With the closed industrial application, only a 
small group of people are authorized to access the 
system. A malicious user could bring the system down, 
but at no personal benefit.  Since the probability of an 
attack on this kind of application is extremely low, a 
cheap system with little or no security logic is 
acceptable.  However, the public application is open to 
anyone, and a successful attack by a hacker could 
cause large-scale financial damage and ruin 
reputations. Such an application requires utmost 
security [14].  
In addition to measuring Risk Exposure to help 
decide which security investments to make to protect 
an RFID system is, potential adopters can also 
calculate Risk Reduction Leverage (RRL). Risk 
Reduction Leverage measures return of investment on 
a risk reduction technique, using the following 
equation: 
 
RRL = (REbefore – REafter) / Risk Reduction Cost, 
 
where RRL is the difference between the system’s Risk 
Exposure before and after a risk reduction activity is 
implemented, divided by the cost of implementation 
[43].  
 
7.  Implications and Future Work  
 
The taxonomy presented above organizes and 
summarizes many of the security issues present in 
RFID systems, and highlight areas for future 
researchers to develop improved solutions to RFID 
security issues. However, more iterations and further 
research is required before they become a definitive 
source for classifying RFID security threats and RFID 
security solutions. According to Hassan & Chatterjee 
2006, a systematic study of a field is “a precursor to 
any detailed research of the field” and that “some 
classification knowledge gives a ground plan” for 
study of the field [5].  Therefore, this study has value 
for potential practitioners and adopters of RFID-based 
systems as a guideline for comparing solutions from 
multiple vendors and evaluating the costs/benefits and 




RFID systems are rapidly evolving, and as 
organizations and governments increasingly seek to 
adopt these systems, RFID security will become even 
more of a critical issue.  In this paper, we attempt to 
explore the current state of RFID security, and describe 
a taxonomy for RFID security threats in order to give 
practitioners a clearer picture of the risks they must 
defend against, and serve as a road map for choosing 
possible solutions.  Finally, we discussed the issues 
that arise when having to balance potential risks to the 
system and the costs of implementing safeguards. 
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